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What Predicts Test of a Three-
Success in JTPA? Component Mode
Carolyn Ball, Ph.D.
The Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), an education and training program to
assist the economically disadvantaged, is one of sixty or more programs Congress
is considering consolidating. This program had great success in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, but its value and support have been declining. This author exam-
ines whether JTPA should continue through a test of three employment theories:
discrimination, signaling, and human investment using data from Maine's JTPA
program. Findings indicate that while the program can reduce discriminatory bar-
riers and negative signals such as welfare status, it does not consistently succeed
as a training investment. Enrollment in an educational training program has a
negative effect on an individual's ability to obtain a job, a particularly important
finding, given the changes in welfare law. If it is to continue in some form, JTPA
must be revised to better serve clients who need education.
In 1982, senators Daniel Quayle and Edward Kennedy crafted the Job Training
Partnership Act (JTPA) (PL 97-300), which states administer by contracting with
service providers to train and place economically disadvantaged individuals. Ten years
later, Congress endorsed JTPA's continuation, increasing the emphasis on literacy and
remedial education.
To continue to receive contracts, providers must meet the program's wage and place-
ment performance standards. Based on its internal evaluation, JTPA has had a success-
ful track record in New England and elsewhere (see Table 1 in Appendix A). Measured
in program years that run from July 1 to June 30, it has consistently achieved about a 70
percent placement rate nationwide from Program Year (PY) '86 to PY '89, dipping
downward with the recession in PY '90. This success has led the National Commission
for Employment Policy to view performance standards as driving JTPA to success. 1
Additionally, many scholars view performance standards as the best measure of pro-
grams.2
Yet even with this strong record, JTPA may encounter difficulty as Congress consid-
ers merging more than sixty education and training programs into block grants. 3 With
the advent of the new welfare law, Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF), JTPA is
again under scrutiny. Congress will undoubtedly expect JTPA to provide greater
assistance to welfare clients, a group it has always served. Since TANF requires able-
bodied individuals to work while receiving welfare, JTPA will have less flexibility in
assisting individuals, about half of whom are welfare recipients. Quick placement will
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be a primary goal with education and training a secondary goal. Given these new pres-
sures, should JTPA continue in its present form or be revised? To answer this question, I
measure JTPA's success through the lens of three common theories of employment:
discrimination, signaling, and human investment theory.
The Job Training Partnership Act is most closely associated with human capital in-
vestment theory. According to legislative intent, training is an investment in individuals
and in the nation's economy, not a government expense.4 Signaling theory, on the other
hand, predicts that employers choose employees based on such signals as education
level, which identify an employee's potential productivity. And, of course, discrimina-
tion theory suggests that employers judge individuals on overt unalterable characteris-
tics, not on ability. Each theory provides a different perspective on the JTPA's ability to
assist participants.
To test these theories, I build exploratory regression models to measure success
based on JTPA performance standards methodology. Success is measured by the out-
comes measures of placements, post-training wages, and education (for those lacking a
seventh-grade reading level or a general equivalency diploma) combined with place-
ment. The data set for the models is from Maine's Title II-A adult program for PYs ' 89
to '91.
JTPA Performance Standards Methodology
What predicts success for the Job Training Partnership Act? The Department of Labor
(DOL) measures it by two general categories of outcomes: placements and post-training
wages. The specific outcomes vary, reflecting changes in the goals of JTPA, refinements
in evaluation, and new data. For example, in PY '93 a new standard, placement com-
bined with education, was added to reflect a legislative mandate to increase the literacy
level of trainees.
After determining outcome measures, DOL creates ordinary least squares regression
models. Unlike textbook models, which provide explanations, these models of regres-
sion are meant to be management tools which do not include all the factors that might
affect outcomes. Models "hold constant those factors over which the service deliverer
has little or no control."5 Therefore, JTPA models control for participant characteristics
and area economic differences. JTPA models control for the difficulty of serving
women, minorities, welfare recipients, and those who lack a high school education,
groups that DOL has labeled "hard to serve."6 Success, then, occurs when service pro-
viders meet or exceed standards, a numerical range of acceptable performance.
Theory
Discrimination Theory
Employment discrimination research tells us that there are major differences in wages
between men and women, minorities and whites, and black and white women. 7 We also
know that income and job stability increase with age although economists argue aboute
discrimination through civil rights laws. On the other hand, these same people also
receive higher wages.
Some studies emphasize discrimination as an explanation for wage disparities. For
example, in his 1991 study, Clifford Adelman traced high school graduates in the years
1972 to 1984 to examine the achievements of men and women in the marketplace.9
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Though women had higher aspirations, continued their education at the same rate as
men, and had higher grade point averages in college, their pay was less than that of
men. This held true even when men and women with no family responsibilities were
compared.
In another study, a controlled experiment examined labor-force disparities. 10 Black
and white males were coached on interviewing, matched to control for characteristics
such as age and physical appearance, and given fictitious indistinguishable resumes.
The results indicated that blacks received fewer interviews and job offers than whites.
Studies of Job Training Partnership Act clients in Indiana, Ohio, and Tennessee also
confirm the effect of gender and race on the placement and wages of participants. 11 But
according to Kathryn Anderson, younger clients are more difficult to place than older
clients, countering expectations of discrimination theory. 12
JTPA performance standards models include indicators of protected status age, race,
and gender, making data readily available to put the theory in operation. Based on this
brief review, we expect that JTPA clients would feel the impact of discrimination, af-
fecting the success of JTPA to place individuals.
Signaling Theory
Signals of life choice events are also theorized to affect a participant's chances of em-
ployment. 13 Employers who cannot directly assess productivity consult a person's
record of education or work experience to reduce uncertainty in the hiring decision.
Race, gender, and age, which are unalterable, are distinguished from signals. For ex-
ample, an individual can choose to invest in an education but cannot choose her race.
Obviously, research demonstrates that education is important in determining jobs and
wages, and a few support the applicability of signaling. 14 In one study, John Bishop
found that signals, provided they were conspicuous, did have an effect. 15 High school
graduates with high-level skills did not receive wages any higher than those with low-
level skills. The diploma rather than skill served as the signal of productivity.
Work experience or its lack because of welfare status can serve as a signal as well. 16
Those who report their welfare status are less likely to be hired. Employers prefer to
hire those who are not welfare recipients even when government provides incentives for
hiring those who are.
JTPA studies confirm a statistically significant effect of welfare status and educa-
tion. 17 In fact, Anderson found that welfare status and education had a greater effect on
placement than gender or age. 18 Not surprisingly, then, we hypothesize greater success
for high school graduates and those who do not receive welfare than for those who have
no diploma and receive welfare. JTPA models always include education and welfare
status as control variables.
Human Investment Theory
The mission of the Job Training Partnership Act is based on human investment theory
more than on discrimination or signaling theory. 19 Human investment theory assumes
that public subsidies for training create higher incomes, higher associated taxes, and
social spillovers (reduced health care costs, reduced crime) that assist both society and
the individual. Government subsidizes training because employer and individual deci-
sions lead to insufficient education and training. 20 Employers fail to provide general
training because it is visible to other employers and may lead to turnover. Individuals
often do not seek training on their own because they lack funds or perceive few rewards
75
New England Journal ofPublic Policy
for doing so. Thus, government-sponsored training programs such as JTPA close that
gap by providing training.
JTPA research indicates that the type of training provided is critical to success (see
Glossary for definitions). For example, research has found that on-the-job training con-
sistently yields high placement rates, but by and large has less impact on earnings than
other forms of training. 21 Nationwide, however, more JTPA participants are enrolled in
job search instruction, the least effective type of training.22
It is fair, then, to conjecture that training has an impact on success but varies with
the type of training. DOL performance models adjust for factors outside the control of
service providers, so training activities are normally excluded. However, data on enroll-
ment in the most common forms — on-the-job training, occupational training, educa-
tional training, and job search assistance — are collected and available.
Test of a Three-Component Model
To test the ability of the three theories to explain the success of the Job Training Part-
nership Act, I retain its methodology and measure success as placement, wages, and
placement combined with educational training. Rather than assuming that one theory is
more important than another, I view the theories as three components affecting success.
The probability of success is estimated as a linear function of (unalterable characteris-
tics) + (signals) + (training investments) + e, where e is a random error term. For clarity
and simplicity, I use only the most common factors and outcome measures found in
Department of Labor models and employment theories. The variables are gender and
age to measure discrimination, education and welfare status to measure signaling, and
the four types of training to measure investment. I exclude race in the exploratory mod-
els since there are very few nonwhites in Maine's population or client base. I use logit
regression23 for the two placement models and ordinary least squares regression for the
wage model.
To determine the success of the Job Training Partnership Act, turn first to the place-
ment models in Table 2, Appendix A. Interpreting logit regression is straightforward.
The chi-square improvement indicates that each component of the model is statistically
significant, improving the model's explanatory power as one moves from entering unal-
terable characteristics to training investments.24 One can also examine the cases cor-
rectly predicted. For both the placement and education/placement models, adding the
third component dramatically affects the explanatory power of the models. This is par-
ticularly true in the education/placement model, in which the cases correctly predicted
increase by 8 percent.
The logit regressions, however, show that JTPA's success depends on which theory or
component is viewed. First, as predicted by discrimination theory, JTPA has more diffi-
culty placing older participants. Placements increase as participants become older, ta-
pering off for the oldest participants. But gender is significant only in the education/
placement model. The probability of being placed and having received educational
training, all other factors held constant, is 61 percent for females and 73 percent for
males. 25
JTPA has unexpected success overcoming signal barriers. Welfare recipients have a
greater probability of being placed than non-welfare recipients. Being a dropout has
significance only in the education/placement model, which one might expect. Even here
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the difference is relatively small; the probability of dropouts being placed amounts to
only 3 percent less than that of high school graduates. Signals that normally make it
difficult to find a job have limited effect on Maine trainees.
As expected, the success of JTPA depends on the training. Since the act is based on
human investment theory, this result is more troublesome for its future success as a
stand-alone program. The placement model indicates that only on-the-job training is a
positive investment. But for those who receive educational training, investment in any
additional training, whether job search assistance or occupational training, is a positive
benefit. This seems to indicate that there are two groups of trainees served, those who
can use on-the-job training and those who need a greater investment for their future.
How do the three components affect success measured by post-training wages? The
regression model in Table 3, Appendix A, shows that with each component, the R-
square increases by about 2 percent, and all components work in the direction theo-
rized. The investment component's impact, again, is highly dependent on the type of
training provided. Only occupational training increases wages. On-the-job training has
a negative impact while educational training is not significant. What appears to be hap-
pening is that service providers can, for the most part, overcome discrimination and
negative signals when placing individuals, but wages are affected by all three compo-
nents.
Strength of Theories
The reduced models in Table 4, Appendix A, with nonsignificant variables eliminated,
give a clearer picture. If one views the Job Training Partnership Act as a means to over-
come discrimination or signaling life events, the program has been successful. For ex-
ample, signals have no significance in the education/placement model;26 wages, how-
ever, are more difficult to equalize. When all other factors are removed or partialed,
indicated in the last column of Table 4, female wages decrease by about .19 and drop-
out wages by about .12.
If one views JTPA through the lens of an investment strategy, the reduced models
reveal greater problems. The probability of placement for those who receive educational
training decreases by about .20 when all other variables are removed. This is a dramatic
effect: receiving educational training is the most important variable in explaining the
lack of success of JTPA as an investment. Only occupational training has an effect on
increasing post-training wages and serves as an investment strategy..
The Relation of Theory and Practice
How do these theoretical results relate to practice? Before answering that question, one
has to resolve a technical issue. Have the theories actually been tested? The R-square
and the comparable chi-square indicate that critical factors were left out of the three-
component models, biasing the results. The Center for Governmental Studies at North-
ern Illinois University, however, has found that performance standards models routinely
explain 5 to 7 percent of the variance regardless of the demographic or economic data
included. 27 Therefore, given similar modeling results, the three-component models show
that service providers have been successful at overcoming discrimination and negative
signals in their placement policies. In fact, Maine welfare recipients have a greater
likelihood than non-welfare recipients of being placed.
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To improve the success rate, however, JTPA sendee providers must be aware of cre-
ating a human investment strategy, particularly for their welfare clients. With the Work
First philosophy DOL is embracing to support TANF legislation, greater emphasis has
to be given to on-the-job training. 28 In the past, DOL frowned on such training, viewing
it as a subsidy to employers who would teach individuals anyway. JTPA needs to in-
crease its contacts with the business community to make on-the-job training possible for
more than a small group of people. Job search assistance alone is not likely to benefit
people even though it is the most common form of training nationwide.
The Job Training Partnership Act currently balances emphasis on placements with
wage performance standards. Performance standards are expected to continue, but states
will be receiving bonuses for welfare placements. This will make it more difficult for
JTPA to improve educational opportunities and, hence, recipients' future wages. In
Maine, virtually no welfare recipients have received both on-the-job training and educa-
tional training. Those entering JTPA in need of remedial education have been difficult
to place, which is not likely to change. But if clients receive an additional investment in
other forms of training, they will be placed and their wages may be comparable.
Finally, JTPA has to build upon its success in overcoming signal barriers for welfare
clients by active involvement in helping individuals make decisions about their training
and by obtaining resources for clients once they complete the program. Nationally,
welfare recipient wages have risen steadily but only to an average of S7.05 per hour for
a thirty-six-hour week. On-the-job training can meet their short-term needs, but occupa-
tional training has greater success in increasing participant wages. Considering the
Work First emphasis, however, fewer JTPA clients may see occupational training as a
viable option. Welfare recipients, with some exceptions, must work. States that value
higher wages for JTPA clients will have to request exemptions, since the act provides
funding for only two years of schooling when many careers demand at least four years?*
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Glossary
Educational training: conducted in an institutional setting, training designed to enhance
participants' employability by upgrading basic skills, for example, remedial education,
basic/GED education, literacy, and English as a second language. Educational training
does not provide the technical skills and knowledge required to perform a specific job
or group of jobs nor does it provide job search assistance such as resume writing, inter-
viewing skills, and so forth.
Job search assistance: activities designed to facilitate movement into the labor market
including job-seeking skills, resume writing, interviewing techniques and job referrals,
labor-market information placement assistance, job clubs, counseling, and help in es-
tablishing and achieving employment goals.
Occupational training: conducted in an institutional setting, training designed to pro-
vide the technical skills and knowledge required to perform a specific job or group of
jobs. Classroom vocational training is included in this category.
On-the-job training: provides the knowledge and skills necessary for full performance
of a job while participants are engaged in productive work. Employers that provide on-
the-job training may be reimbursed for their services.
Placement: includes only the formerly employed who are placed in an unsubsidized
job, enter the armed forces, become self-employed, or enter a registered apprenticeship
program.
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Table 2
Logistic Regressions of Success
Placed Placed with Educational Training
B B B B B
Unalterable
Characteristics
Gender 0.259° 0.124 0.089 0.51
1
a 0.326 0.562"
Age 0.092" 0.095 s 0.082 s 0.1 1 3 a 0.117 8 0.140"
Agesq -0.001 a -0.001 s -0.011 s -0.001" -0.002" -0.002"
Signals
Welfare 0.507 b 0.390 b — 0.766 b 0.441 s
Dropout -0.153 -0.018 -0.333 -0.128"
Investments
On-the-job
training — — 1.748 a — — —
Educational -1.634 s — — —
Occupational — — -0.382 s — - 0.033 c
Job Search — — — — — 0.905 c
Explained 76.4% 76.4% 77.9% 65.3% 64.7% 72.9%
Correctly
- 2LL 2539 2516 2377 644 629 570
Chi-square 17. b 22.
9
C 139. b 9.9 a 15.
9
b 58.
1
c
improvement
N = 2369 for the placement model.
N = 504 for the placement with educational training model.
Source: Data files of the Maine Department of Labor, Augusta, for PY '89 to PY 91'
Notes:
Placed =
Gender =
Age
Dropout
Welfare
Training
1 = Placed; = Not placed.
1 = Male; = Female.
22 through 70.
1 = No GED; = GED/high school diploma.
1 = Welfare; = Not on welfare.
1 = Received training; = Did not receive training.
"Significant at .05 level.
bSignificant at .001 level.
Significant at .0001 level.
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Table 3
Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of Success
Unalterable
Characteristics
Gender
Age
Agesq
Signals
Welfare
Dropout
Wage
B
0.6556 a 0.8315 3 0.9431 a
0.1391 b 0.1257 b 0.1224 b
-0.0017 b -0.0015 b -0.0015°
-0.2612 d -0.2758 d
—
-0.8324 d -0.8324 d
Investments
OJT
Educational
Occupational
F
R-square
R-squareCh
— —
-0.2861 d
— — 0.0724
— — 0.4820 a
15.6700 a 16.2620 a 14.2200 a
0.0282 0.04788 0.06584
0.0282 0.01966 0.01796
N = 1623
Source: Data files of the Maine Department of Labor, Augusta, PY '86 to PY '91.
"Significant at .0001 level.
bSignificant at .001 level.
Significant at .01 level.
Significant at .05 level.
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Table 4
Final Models
Placement
Placement with Education Wages
B Rao B Rao B Partial
Observed
Characteristics
Gender — — 0.640 a 0.092 0.942 b 0.189
Age 0.083 a 0.045 — — 0.122 b 0.083
Agesq -o.oor -0.052 — — -0.002 b -0.078
Life Events
Welfare 0.414 b 0.070 — — -0.269' -0.056
Dropout — — — — -0.275 b -0.118
Training
On-the-job 1.755 b 0.070 — — -0.298 c -0.051
Educational -1.635 b -0.200 — — — —
Occupational -0.388 a -0.044 0.970 d 0.133 0.479 b 0.105
Job Search — — 1.037 b 0.182 — —
Explained
Correctly 77.7% - 73.05% - — —
-2LL 2377 580.59 — F 16.210
Chi-square 178.41 — 73.718 — R-sq 0.066
Chi-square 7.04 — 7.837 - R-sq Ch 0.020
improvement
N = 2369 for the placement model.
N = 501 for the placement with educational training model.
N = 1623 for the wage model
Note: In the placement with education model, job search rather than on-the-job training.
Only four individuals were enrolled in the latter and received educational training.
Significant at .01 level.
"Significant at .0001 level.
'Significant at .05 level.
Significant at .001 level.
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